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THE BAROMETER is a student bi-weekly newspaper for the exchange of 
ideas and information concerning the development and improvement of 
the professional environment at the Naval Postgraduate School. Items 
of interest, papers, and articles of interests to the students, staff, 
and faculty as a whole are solicited. 
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"When there is a visible enemy to fight in open combat •.• 
many serve, all applaud, and the tide of patriotism runs 
high. But when there is a long, slow struggle, with no 
immediate visable foe, your choice will be hard indeed." 
John F. Kennedy: Address to the graduating class, u.S. 
Naval Academy, 6 June 1961 
EDITORS COMMENT: This weeks feature article comes from the research of LTCOL Charles D. 
WOOD, USMC. He is a 1968 graduate of the Naval Postgraduate School and a member of the 
1973 Industrial College of the Armed Forces class. The article appeared in the Winter 
1974-74 issue of Perspectives in Defense Management. 
FEATURE: THE AMPERICAN MILITARY PROFESSION IN THE 70's 
"The disengagement of u.s. ground-combat units from Vietnam, a major cutback in troop 
strength, and the expiration of the draft, mark the end of an era for U.S. armed forces. 
Just as critical turning points in the life of a man cause relfection, inventory and 
projection, so it is with institutions. The closeout of the longest and most frustrating 
war in our nation's history, therefore, is causing a careful examination of the whole 
military institution. It is the heyday of the critic, from within and outsdie the 
system, and a time for serious analysts to shape the confusions of the recent past into 
understandable history. But even more than that, concerned observers will try to determine, 
'Where are we now, and where are we going?' How will the American military profession 
change in the new environment of the seventies? 
PROFESSIONALISM-THREE DEFINITIONS 
What is 'professionalism'? The term is used in several ways and takes on a special 
meaning depending on its use. To many, professionalism implies nothing more specific than 
expertise, efficiency, and dependability. A service or unit composed of well-trained 
and highly motivated personnel could be called 'professional' as a complimentary description 
of its performance or state of readiness, regardless of the career commitment of its 
members. This is a popular use of the term within a service in setting standards or 
evaluating individuals and units. Thus the phrases 'in a highly professional manner' 
and 'a real professional' are equated with the entire spectrum of military virtues. Brig-
adier General Robert Bohn, upon assuming command of the 2d Marine Division, wrote an open 
letter to the men of his command describing professionalism as 'the ultimate weapon'. A 
member of the Marine Corps Officer Candidate School Staff at Quantico similarly stated: 
'Professionalism is eliteness, a standard to identify with, a concept to strive for, an 
idean to maintain'. 
Another application of the term distinguishes the paid volunteer fr.om the drafted 
'citizen-soldier'. Used in this manner, a professional soldier is simply a 'mercenary' 
who theoretically performs his services for the highest bidder and is totally motivated by 
monetary gain. Those who fear a well-paid, all-volunteer force often use the term 
'professional army' with this definition in mind. They see great professionalization of 
the armed forces ultimately leading to a military castewith its own ideology and politics. 
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A third definition of 'professionalism,' and the one most approriate here, is that of 
the foremost academicians who specialize in military sociology. Professionalism refers to 
the military profession as a vocation, much as the term might be applied to doctors, lawyers, 
or clergymen. To qualify as a profession, according to Samuel P. Huntington, a profession 
must contain three essentail ingredients: experties, responsibility, and corporateness. 
The expertise consists of a specialized knowledge and skill obtained only by prolonged 
education and experience. Responsibility implies that the professional must have society 
as a client for his services and must employ his expertise to benefit society. Corporateness 
refers to a sense of unity as a group apart from laymen, a bond of common work and disciplin~ 
and the sharing of a unique responsibility. Most authors address their attention only to 
regular commissioned officers when referring to 'professionalism' in this sense. As will 
be pointed out later, this restriction may not be appropriate to the current and future 
character of U.S. armed forces. 
DEVELOPMENT OF AMERICAN MILITARY PROFESSIONALISM 
Until the early 1950's, American policy traditionally relegated the military to a 
minor role in times of peace. Force levels were low, budgets meager, military influence 
almost negligible. After demobilizing from thirteen million men in 1945 to less than one 
million by 1947, however, the nation was faced with a succession of crises which continued ~ 
through the cold-war period. These circumstances contributed to a significant modification 
of this policy. During this entire time, large forces were maintained and military 
professionalism prospered. The profession was held in high regard by the general public 
and offered an attraticve career with status, overseas assignment, ample pay, and a strong 
sense of service to the society. The defense industry sector of the economy grew and 
flourished in response to the nation's desire to maintain an assured military superiority 
over all potential enemies. 
During this period, however, some basic changes were occurring in the military profession. 
Possibly the most signficant was the emergency of the military 'manager' in the officer 
corps. His appearance was made necessary by the increased complexity of the system of 
procuring new weaponry and operating sophisticated logistical organizations. Under a 
resources-management oriented Secretary of Defense, it was imperative that the manager/ 
officer be well educated in budgeting, project management, data processing, and systems 
analysis. 
Another important change in the character of the officer coprs was increasing special-
ization in technical fields, really an acceleration of a trend started in World War II. 
The impetus was provided by rewarding the specialized officer with improved promotional 
opportunities, still more education, and the enhancement of skills transferable to civilian 
life after retirement. 
The demands of the system during these cold-war years established the environment for 
what has been notoriously labelled as 'careerism' or 'ticket-punching.' Simply stated, 
many officers moved through a series of prescribed steps which they (correctly) identified 
as the avenue to rapid advancement. Additionally, the whole attitude toward the military 
as a profession was altered by the knowledge that good jobs awaited the technically qualified 
officer in civilian life. As military sociologist Morris Janowitz stated in 1964: 
'The new nature of military service drastically alters the significance 
of being an officer. For many it is less a professional commitment than a phase 
in a longer occupational career. The entire military establishment in many 
respects ceases to be a world of a profession but become instead geared to 
the mobility needs of individuals.' 
Another significant precedent, for the United States, was the employment of forces in 
a major combat role without a declaration of war or clear national commitment to the 
ultimate goals of the conflict. In the Korea War, as one writer put it, 
'The common soldier fought solely and simply because he was order to 
fight and not because he felt any identification with the political goals 
of the war, he was motivated largely by unit esprit, and concerned mainly 
with rotation home.' 
THE IMPACT OF VIETNAM 
In its later stages, the Vietnam War was a traumatic experience for American military 
professionalism, akin in its effects to a series of sharp blows to the midsection, some a 
little below the belt. The professional is pained but unbowed, for only he, in his own 
min~is capable of totally assessing the Vietnam experience. He knows the restrictions 
under which he was sent to battle, how he and his unit conducted themselves, and the true 
dimensions of the leadership challenges he faced. He cannot deny, however, that his 
profession has suffered. 
First, the loss of prestige and respect, and the lack of public acclaim for his efforts. 
This hurts deeply, though the professional would not readily admit it. Then there is the 
question of competence in the conduct of the war. Were military commanders unimaginative? 
Was leadership poor? Did proven tactics fail? 
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Some of the severest criticism comes from within, and causes the most damage to the 
military reputation when viewed from outside. Typical are s trictures of Colonel David U. 
Hackworth, who attacks his profession for lack of combat l eadership and battlefield pro-
ficiency. Significantly, he places responsibility on the system which required officers 
to become jacks-of-all-trades, 'officers who would not only command fighting men but also 
teach physics, serve as statesmen, and advise industry.' The ineffective leader is 
further described as ' •.• the ticket-puncher whose desire for advancement placed self, 
consciously or unconsciously, before profession or country. ' 
The Vietnam War also created an attitude among the young people of the country which 
cannot be ignored. The main concern is not for the violent antimilitarism of the vocal 
few, but what is best described by Colonel Richard F. Rosser as a general feeling of 
'amilitarism ••• apathy toward the military and all things connected with it.' 
Another impact of the Vietnam War is the effect that the bitter aftertaste of the war 
will have on future national-defense issues. Along with a changing world-power structure, 
the 'no more Vietnams' attitude will have much to say about the future size, structure, 
and role of the military. 
WHERE ARE WE NOW? 
The military profession finds itself at a major crossroads, and not completely in 
agreement about which road it should take or will be required to take. 
One of the most significant issues in the U.IS. armed forces is 'humanization.' T@ ;:a 
varying degree and in different ways, the services are undergoing an explosion of social 
consciousness. The Air Force and the Navy are in the vanguard of the effort to adapt 
military service to coincide with the lifestyle of today's youth. The Marine Corps, being 
small and always a bit different, takes a hard-line approach to discipline, appearance, 
and physical fitness. The Army is caught in the middle, concerned about recruiting and 
wary that 'adapting' may lead to a reduction in combat effectiveness. 
The welfare role of the armed forces is a matter of current debate. Some see the 
peacetime military as an excellent training vehicle for the underprivileged, the minorities, 
and the unemployed. Project 100,000 and Project Transition are considered successful 
forerunners by advocates of a significant welfare role. Some sociologists are urging 
military participation in large-scale domestic-action programs, possibly involving environ-
mental protection or other public-service endeavors. As a minimum, current policies 
encourage the services to set an example in dealing with such societal issues as racial 
discrimination, drug abuse, and equal rights for women. 
Against the background of Vietnam and the cultural revolution, the services have now 
plunged into the brave new world of the all-volunteer force. It is the present reality, 
and the services now compete in the marked place for the nation's manpower. 
The current changes in the world-power structure and the full implementation of the 
Nixon Doctrine may significantly alter the role of u.S. armed forces. The services may 
well ask at this point, 'What should we prepared for?' Particularly for the Army, there 
are no clearcut answers. Some, like Morris Janowitz, foresee a 'constabulary role' for 
the military establishment, characterized by preparedness and a minimum use of force 
coupled with negotiations to seek merely satisfactory or tolerable rather than victorious, 
resolutions of conflicts. 
CHALLENGE FOR THE NEW PROFESSIONAL 
The new professional has a unique and demanding career ahead of him. Assuming a declin-
ing force, advancement will be slower than in the past. The probability of actually being 
tested in combat is lower than ever, and he may anticipate a full career without acquiring 
campaign ribbons, medals for valor, or actual combat experience. He may well be faced 
with austere budgets and public indifference to his assessment of the defense posture of 
the nation. 
The new professional will be a 'two career' man, simply because there will not be 
enough positions at the top of the hierarchy, and the most specialized officers will not 
meet the requirements for the 'generalist; needed at top levels. The requirement for 
'up or out; will mean that most officers will have to plan for a second career in order to 
provide for their families and meet personal success goals. 
The new professional will not serve overseas with dependents as frequently as in the 
past, and a larger percentage will live in public quarters on military stations. There 
will be a tendency to be more isolated from civilian communities. As a career incentive, 
however, there will be increased opportunities for advanced education at civilian 
universities, further contributing to two-careerism. 
The new professional may have to make an early choice between being a specialist or a 
generalist. There are indications that the services will make greater distinctions in 
career patterns for those who are identified as combat leaders as opposed to those who serve 
in staff and support assignments. In short, the services will have to recognize the n~~d 
for manning the ready forces with the best qualified leaders at all times." 
